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Abstract
In this paper, we have studies the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on foreign asset ac-
cumulation in a wealth e¤ect model used by Bardhan (1967), Kurz (1968), Calvo (1980)
and Blanchard (1983). Our results di¤er dramatically from the ones in Obstfeld (1981).
In particular, we have shown that government spending always reduces foreign asset accu-
mulation (or increases foreign borrowing). While Obstfelds model turned the conventional
Mundell-Fleming model on its head, our wealth e¤ect approach has restored its validity.
JEL Classication Numbers: E58, E63, F52.
0.1 I. Introduction
This paper examines the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on foreign asset accumulation in a
small open economy. It obtains policy implications that are very di¤erent from many existing
studies such as Turnovsky (1985, 1987) and, in particular, Obstfeld (1981). In an often-cited
paper, Obstfeld (1981) presents three interesting results regarding the e¤ects of government
policies on foreign asset holdings: (1) foreign exchange intervention is found to have no real e¤ects
when o¢ cial foreign reserves earn interest that is distributed to the public; (2) ination leads
to higher long-run consumption and foreign claims; (3) an increase in government consumption
induces a surplus on current account in the short run and larger foreign asset accumulation in the
long run. The intertemporal optimization framework used by Obstfeld in this study and some
related studies Obstfeld (1982, 1990) has also inuenced the open economy macroeconomics in
the past decade.
In this paper, we are going to show that the policy implications of Obstfelds model hinge
on the special assumption of Uzawas (1968) time preference and they are totally reversed and
substantially changed in a dynamic optimization model with the wealth e¤ect. The Beckers
endogenous time preference developed in our paper is adapted from the models of Bardhan
(1967), Kurz (1968), Calvo (1980), Blanchard (1983), Barro (2003), Brueckner (2000), and
Solow (2003) and denes the representative agents utility function on foreign asset in addition
to consumption and real balances. The main results derived from our model stand in striking
contrast to the ones in Obstfeld paper: (1) foreign exchange intervention leads to more foreign
asset holdings and more consumption in the long run; (2) if the utility function is separable
in consumption and real balances as in Obstfeld (1981), ination has no e¤ect on the real
variables in both short run and long run; if the utility function is nonseparable, ination results
in more foreign asset accumulation when the cross derivative of consumption and real balances
is positive; (3) government spending always reduces foreign asset accumulation and crowds out
private consumption.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up a simple wealth e¤ect model with money
and discusses the stability and some policy implications of the model. Section III makes detailed
comparative study on the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies. We conclude our paper in Section
IV.
0.2 II. The Model
We consider a small economy in a competitive world market. The economy is populated with
many identical people. We follow Sidrauski (1967), dene a representative agents instantaneous
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utility as
u(c;m) = u(c) + v(m)
where c is consumption, m is real balance holdings. Suppose the agent derive the positive utility
from consumption goods and money holding, but with positive, but diminshing marginal utility
of consumption goods and money holding.
The representative agents discounted utility over an innite horizon can be written as
max
Z 1
0
u(c;m)e tdt
where
t =
Z t
0
(s(v))dv ((1))
is the Beckers endogenous time preference, s is consumers expenditure on decreasing the time
preference, and (:) : R! [0; 1] satises

0
< 0; 
00
> 0 ((2))
Condition (2) state that with the increasing of spending on s, the time preference will decrease,
but the marginal value of it is increasing.
The agents total wealth dened as
a = b+m ((3))
and his budget constraint is
da
dt
= y + rb+   c  s  m ((4))
where y is output, x is the government transfer,  is the expected ination rate and r is the
returns on the foreign bonds, which is given in the world capital market. The representative
agent choose his consumption paths of a and s, holding of foreign bonds and money to maximize
his discounted utility, i.e.
max
Z 1
0
u(c;m)e tdt
subject to the budget constraint (3) and (4), with t given by equation (1) and initial bonds
holding b(0) is given.
Using the fact
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dt = (s(t))dt
we can transfer our model into the form
max
Z 1
0
u(c;m)
(s(v))
e td
subject to
da
d
=
y + rb+   c  s  m
(s(v))
and equation (3)
Dene the Hamiltonian
H =
u(c;m)
(s(v))
+ 
y + rb+   c  s  m
(s(v))
+ 
a  b m
(s(v))
The rst-order conditions are summarized as follows
uc =  ((5))
um =  +  ((6))
r =  ((7))
  u(c;m)
(s(v))2

0   1

  (r   n)a+ w +   c  s  ( + r)m
(s(v))2

0   a  b m
(s(v))2
0 = 0 ((8))
d
d
=
  
(s(v))
((9))
and transversality condition
lim
!1
ae  = 0
From equations (5), (6) and (7), we have
uc =  ((5))
um = ( + r) ((10))
Equation (5) is the formally condition which states marginal utility of consumption equals
marginal value of wealth. Equations shows that the marginal utility of money holding equals
real interest rate measured by marginal utility of consumption.
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With the aid of dt = (s(t))dt, Euler equation (9) can be transferred into the form
d
dt
= ((s)  r) ((11))
and the transervesality conditions can be rewritten as
lim
!1
ae  = 0
0.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
In order to derive the macroeconomic equilibrium, we must consider the exchange market.
Suppose the home price of the goods is p, and the corresponding world price is p . From
purchasing power parity, we have
p = Ep ((12))
where E is the exchange rate. With proper normalization, p can be set to one.
To fully spell out the dynamics, we need to specify the government sector. Government
revenue comes from money creation and interest earnings from the central banks reserves, i.e.,
, and R denotes the amount of reserves. Government also consumes goods, g, makes transfer,
x, to the representative agent. So its budget is given by
g + x =
dM
dt
=p+ rR ((13))
or
g + x =
dM
dt
=M
M
p
+ rR
Let the money growth rate be a positive constant 
dM
dt
=M = 
Then we can write equation (13) as
g + x = m+ rR ((14))
By denition, m = M=p, we have
dm
dt
= (
dM
dt
=M   dp
dt
=p)m ((15))
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On the perfect foresight path, the expected ination rate is equal to the actual ination rate:
dp
dt
=p =
de
dt
=e = 
where e is expected rate of exchange rate depreciation. Therefore
dm
dt
= (   )m ((16))
Now, the macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy is summarized by equations (3),(4),
(5), (8), (10), (11), (14), (16), and the transversality condition.
0.3.1 Short-run equilibrium
From equations (3), (5), (8), (10), we can express ; s; and  as the functions of c; b;m; r; ; g; R;
and y:
 = (c; b;m; r) ((17))
s = s(c; b;m; r; ; g;R; y) ((18))
 = (c; b;m; r) ((19))
and from the appendix we have
c =
1
ucc
< 0; b = 0; r = 0; m = 0 ((20))
c =  u
00(c)( + r)
u0(c)
> 0; b = 0; r =  1; m = umm
u0(c)
< 0 ((21))
sc =
ucm
0c   ucc
u00
; sb =
ucr
0
 u00 > 0; s

r =
ucm
0r   uc(b+R)0
u00
> 0;
sm =
ucm
0m   um0
u00
> 0; s =
ucm
0
 u00 > 0; s

y =
uc
0
 u00 > 0; ((22))
sR =
ucr
0
 u00 > 0; s

g =
uc
0
u00
< 0
From equation (20), we know that marginal value of wealth is a decreasing function of consump-
tion level. Equation (21) states that, with the increasing of consumption, the expected ination
rate will increase, but with the increasing of interest rate and money demand, the expected
ination rate will decrease. In order to eliminate the complication, equation (22) presents a
steady-state relation.
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0.3.2 Dynamics
Substitute equations (17), (18), and (19) into equations (4), (11), and (16), we get the full
dynamic system of foreign bonds, consumption and real balances
db
dt
= y + rb+ rR  g   c  s(c; b;m; r; ; g;R; y) ((23))
dc
dt
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
(r   (s(c; b;m; r; ; g;R; y))) ((24))
dm
dt
= (   (c; b;m))m ((25))
And the steady state satises
y + rb + rR  g   c   s(c; b;m; r; ; g; R; y) = 0
  u
0(c)
u00(c)
(r   (s(c; b;m; r; ; g; R; y))) = 0
(   (c; b;m))m = 0
To understand the stability of the system, we linearize equations (23), (24), and (25) around
the steady state values0BB@
db
dt
dc
dt
dm
dt
1CCA =
0BB@
r   sb  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm  cm  mm
1CCA
0BB@
b  b
c  c
m m
1CCA
The determinant of coe¢ cient matrix of above linear system is given by
 =
0BB@
r   sb  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm  cm  mm
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m
0BB@
r  1 0
sb sc sm
0 c m
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m[r(scm   smc) + sbm]
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0mr
u00( + r)um0 + umm(ucc+ 0)
 u00u0
< 0
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which is negative. In this case, the dynamic system has one negative and two positive charac-
teristic roots because the product of the three roots is negative and the sum of the three roots
is also positive and is given by the trace of the 3x3 matrix, . Therefore, the dynamic system has
a unique perfect foresight path near the steady state.
0.4 Comparative Static Solutions
We know that the steady-state value (b; c;m) satises
y + rb + rR  g   c   s(c; b;m; r; ; g; R; y) = 0 ((26))
  u
0(c)
u00(c)
(r   (s(c; b;m; r; ; g; R; y))) = 0 ((27))
(   (c; b;m))m = 0 ((28))
And from equations (17), (18), and (19), we can determine the steady-state value , s, and
. Next, we analyze the e¤ects of exogenous variables on the steady-state value b; c;m; ,
s, and  .
Total di¤erentiate on equations (26), (27), and (28), we get0BB@
r   sb  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm  cm  mm
1CCA
0BB@
db
dc
dm
1CCA
=
0BB@
s
  u0(c)u00(c)0s
 m
1CCA d +
0BB@
1 + sg
  u0(c)u00(c)0sg
0
1CCA dg +
0BB@
 b R+ sr
  u0(c)u00(c)0sr
0
1CCA dr ((30))
+
0BB@
 r + sR
  u0(c)u00(c)0sR
0
1CCA dR+
0BB@
 1 + sy
  u0(c)u00(c)0sy
0
1CCA dy
We have
Proposition 1: Ination increases foreign asset accumulation and consumption level, but
decreases domestic real balance holdings.
Proof: See the Appendix, we have
db
d
=
b

> 0;
dc
d
=
c

> 0;
dm
d
=
m

< 0
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Proposition 2: Government spending always increases long-run foreign asset accumulation..
Proof:
db
dg
=
gb

> 0;
dc
dg
=
gc

= 0;
dm
dg
=
gm

= 0
Proposition 3: With the increasing of output, long-run foreign asset accumulation will de-
crease.
db
dy
=
yb

< 0;
dc
dy
=
yc

= 0;
dm
dy
=
ym

= 0
Proposition 4: The world interest rate will decrease long-run foreign asset accumulation,
but increase domestic consumption and real balance holding.
db
dr
=
rb

< 0;
dc
dr
=
rc

> 0;
dm
dr
=
rm

> 0
Proposition 5: The central banks purchase of foreign claims from the public with domestic
currency will lead to less foreign asset accumulation.
db
dR
=
Rb

< 0;
dc
dR
=
Rc

= 0;
dm
dR
=
Rm

= 0
0.5 IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studies the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on foreign asset accumulation
in a wealth e¤ect model used by Bardhan (1967), Kurz (1968), Calvo (1980), Blanchard (1983),
Yin (2008), and Zhang and Xu (2011). Our results di¤er dramatically from the ones in Obstfeld
(1981). In particular, we have shown that government spending always reduces foreign asset
accumulation (or increases foreign borrowing). While Obstfelds model turned the conventional
Mundell-Fleming model on its head, our wealth e¤ect approach has restored its validity.
Evaluating the consequences of macroeconomic policies is complicated; and the results are
often very sensitive to the optimization framework we have utilized. Our wealth e¤ect model
only provides a di¤erent perspective to the problems and it should be taken as complementary
to many existing models.
0.6 Appendix A Derive of Short-run Equilibrium
From equation (3), (5), (5), and (8), we get
uc =  ((A1))
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um = ( + r) ((A2))
  u(c;m)
(s(v))2

0   1

  y + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  m
(s(v))2

0
= 0 ((A3))
we get
 = (c; b;m; r)
s = s(c; b;m; r; ; g;R; y)
 = (c; b;m; r)
and, we have
c =
1
ucc
> 0; b = 0; r = 0; m = 0 ((A4))
c =  u
00(c)( + r)
u0(c)
> 0; b = 0; r =  1; m = umm
u0(c)
< 0 ((A5))
sc =
ucm
0c   ucc  uccfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg0
u00 + ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sb =
ucr
0
 u00   ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sr =
ucm
0r   uc(b+R)0
u00 + ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sm =
ucm
0m   um0   ucf   g00
u00 + ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
s =
ucm
0
 u00   ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sy =
uc
0
 u00   ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sR =
ucr
0
 u00   ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
sg =
uc
0
u00 + ucfy + rb+ m+ rR  g   c  s  mg00
Substituting the steady-state conditions (27), (28), and (29) into the above equations, we get
sc =
ucm
0c   ucc
u00
; sb =
ucr
0
 u00 > 0; s

r =
ucm
0r   uc(b+R)0
u00
> 0;
sm =
ucm
0m   um0
u00
> 0; s =
ucm
0
 u00 > 0; s

y =
uc
0
 u00 > 0; ((A6))
sR =
ucr
0
 u00 > 0; s

g =
uc
0
u00
< 0
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0.7 Appendix B
From Equation (30), we have0BB@
r   sb  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm  cm  mm
1CCA
0BB@
db
dc
dm
1CCA
=
0BB@
s
  u0(c)u00(c)0s
 m
1CCA d +
0BB@
1 + sg
  u0(c)u00(c)0sg
0
1CCA dg +
0BB@
 b R+ sr
  u0(c)u00(c)0sr
0
1CCA dr ((30))
+
0BB@
 r + sR
  u0(c)u00(c)0sR
0
1CCA dR+
0BB@
 1 + sy
  u0(c)u00(c)0sy
0
1CCA dy
b =
0BB@
s  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)(0s) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 m  cm  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
0  1 0
 s sc sm
1 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ sm   sm] =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m
um
0
u00
< 0
gb =
0BB@
1 + sg  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)0sg u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
0  cm  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
1  1 0
 sg sc sm
0 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[(scm   smc)  sgm] = =r < 0
rb =
0BB@
 b R+ sr  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)(0sr) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
0  cm  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
 b R  1 0
 sr sc sm
0 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ (b+R)(scm   smc)  srm]
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ (b+R)(scm   smc)  u
0m0rm
u00
  (b+R)sbm=r]
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m
u0m0m
u00
  (b+R)=r > 0
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yb =
0BB@
 1 + sy  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)(0sy) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
0  cm  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
 1  1 0
 sy sc sm
0 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ (scm   smc)  sym] =  =r > 0
Rb =
0BB@
 r + sR  1  sc  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)(0sR) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
0  cm  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
 r  1 0
 sR sc sm
0 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ r(scm   smc)  sRm] =   > 0
c =
0BB@
r   sb s  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb)   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0s
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm  m  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r 0 0
sb  s sm
0 c m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0mr( sm   smc) =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0mr
um
0c
u00
< 0
gc =
0BB@
r   sb 1 + sg  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb)   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sg
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm 0  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r 1 0
sb  sg sm
0 0 m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ rsgm   sbm] = 0
rc =
0BB@
r   sb  b R+ sr  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb)   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sr
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm 0  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r  b R 0
sb  sr sm
0 0 m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ rsrm + sbm(b+R)] =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m
ucm
0
u00
< 0
yc =
0BB@
r   sb  1 + sy  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb)   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sy
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm 0  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r  1 0
sb  sy sm
0 0 m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[ rsym + sbm] = 0
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Rc =
0BB@
r   sb  r + sR  sm
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb)   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sR
u0(c)
u00(c)
0sm
 bm 0  mm
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r  r 0
sb  sR sm
0 0 m
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[r( sRm + sbm)] = 0
m =
0BB@
r   sb 1  sc s
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0s
 bm  cm  m
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
 r 1 0
 sb sc s
0 c 1
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[r(sc   sc)  sb] =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0m[
r(u00 + u00)
 u00 ] > 0
gm =
0BB@
r   sb  1  sc 1  sg
  u0(c)u00(c)( 0sb) u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sc   u
0(c)
u00(c)
0sg
 bm  cm 0
1CCA =   u0(c)u00(c)0m
0BB@
r  1 1
sb sc  sg
0 c 0
1CCA
=   u
0(c)
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